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ABSTRACT
INVESTOR REACTION TO EXPLORATION VERSUS EXPLOITATION USING AN
ASORPTIVE CAPACITY LENS
by
Kevin Walsh
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2021
Under the Supervision of Professor Edward Levitas
In his seminal work, March (1991) points to innovation as a key to a firm’s survival. In
this dissertation proposal, I seek to build on March’s research by leveraging his construct of
balancing a focus on improving existing capabilities (“exploitation”) while simultaneously
creating new competencies (“exploration”). These two approaches to innovation are often
viewed as requiring a firm to leverage very different skills. Not only are there differing skills, but
the level of risk and potential reward also vary based on a firm’s decision to focus on exploration
versus exploitation. The reaction of investors to this dichotomy is the focus of my dissertation
proposal.
While researching this dilemma, Fitzgerald et al. (2021) found that investors often focus
on a firm’s explorative initiatives due to the new and unfamiliar natural of these innovations.
However, despite this investor focus on exploration, firms concentrating on exploitation tend to
experience superior operating results - at least in the short term. Their research goes on to
suggest that investor focus on exploration may result in undervaluing firms that focus on
exploitation. My study sought to build on their research by exploring two potential moderators
(firm size and patent portfolio) and creating several competing hypotheses using Absorptive
Capacity as a lens. Utilizing a sample of 3660 patents from 164 unique organizations, empirical
results did not find support for the proposed interactions. My study’s approach was unique from
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Fitzgerald et al. (2021) in several regards. These differences as well as limitations and
opportunities for future research are also discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“Innovation is no longer an option, but a necessity.” These words, spoken by Rajiv Sodhi
– Chief Operating Officer at Microsoft India – addressed the criticality of innovation in the face
of a global pandemic (Press Trust of India, 2020). COVID-19 has forced businesses in most
industries to rethink current methodologies and find new, more innovative ways to address
unique challenges ranging from supply chain issues to remote work environments to healthcare
and vaccine development. Business, government, and society in general, have been forced to find
new, innovative ways to meet their needs while protecting themselves in the face of this
pandemic.
A strong focus on innovation is, of course, not a new concept. Indeed, in the summer of
2018, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued its ten millionth patent to
Raytheon Company for a tool with applications as diverse as self-driving cars, medical devices
and even military uses (United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2018). As Andrei Iancu,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office stated, the USPTO plays a key role to “inspire greater innovation and
further economic growth” (United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2018:1). Patents not only
impact our national and global economy but can play a critical role in the financial success of a
business, influence future innovation, and even impact the number of competitors entering a
given market (Andries & Faems, 2013; Cockburn & MacGarvie, 2011). As such, patents have
long been used by researchers to approximate innovation (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2002). Gaining
a better understanding of the impacts of leveraging these tools to protect a firm’s innovations and
intellectual property benefits business leaders and the investment community.
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Mr. Sodhi suggests innovation is critical for survival as all of humankind deals with the
global threat of COVID-19. In his seminal work, March (1991) similarly points to innovation as
a key to a firm’s survival. In this dissertation proposal, I seek to build on March’s research.
While there are many ways to define and measure innovation, I will leverage March’s construct
of balancing a focus on improving existing capabilities (“exploitation”) while simultaneously
creating new competencies (“exploration”) (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). These two
approaches to innovation are often viewed as requiring a firm to leverage very different skills.
The nature of these diverse skillsets creates a significant undertaking for any firm that seeks to be
successful at both exploration and exploitation (Benner & Tushman, 2002; He & Wong, 2004;
March 1991). Not only are there differing skills, but the level of risk and potential reward also
vary based on a firm’s decision to focus on exploration versus exploitation. The reaction of
investors to this dichotomy is the focus of my dissertation proposal.
The unique nature of exploration and exploitation create an unusual challenge for firms.
Past research suggests the tradeoffs between these two approaches could result in different
investor reactions. Exploration, while often more expensive and riskier, creates a greater
opportunity for long term benefit (Uotila, Maula, Keilm & Zahra, 2009). Additionally, the
novelty of explorative research may be more likely to attract the attention of investors than
incremental innovation associated with exploitation (Fitzgerald, Balsmeier, Fleming, & Manso,
2021). Meanwhile, exploitation tends to have lower costs and more immediate impact (Piao &
Zajac, 2016). Further, patents exploiting past innovations have more value than those exploring
new breakthroughs (Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2005). Thus, when determining which stocks to
purchase, investor decisions may be influenced by a firm’s focus on exploration or exploitation.
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While researching this dilemma, Fitzgerald et al. (2021) found that investors often focus
on a firm’s explorative initiatives due to the new and unfamiliar natural of these innovations.
However, despite this investor focus on exploration, firms concentrating on exploitation tend to
experience superior operating results - at least in the short term. Their research goes on to
suggest that investor focus on exploration may result in undervaluing firms that focus on
exploitation. I propose to build on their research by exploring two potential moderators and
creating several competing hypotheses that consider two primary research questions:

Do investors view exploration (exploitation) more positively than exploitation
(exploration)? Further, do firm specific characteristics such as firm size and patent
portfolio moderate this relationship?

For the purposes of this study, I will leverage several publicly available datasets in order
to acquire patent citations, firm characteristics, and stock price information as well as accounting
and financial data. Exploration and exploitation will be determined by looking at self-citations
and historically repeated citations. These behaviors suggest a firm is depending on existing
knowledge - which is consistent with exploitation (Benner & Tushman, 2002).
Additionally, I will leverage an event study methodology established by Brown and
Warner (1985) to determine investor reaction to these patent applications. This approach allows
me to calculate a focal firm’s expected stock return on a given day and compare it to the actual
change in stock price. This lets me to determine if (and how) investors react to the patent
application.
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My proposed dissertation will contribute to scholarly research on several fronts. First, it
builds on a long history of exploring how patents impact firm performance and contribute to
overall economic growth and addresses calls for further research in this area (Kline, Williams, &
Zidar, 2019; Somaya, 2012). Additionally, it provides further insights into factors influencing
investor reactions by exploring the potential moderating effects of a firm’s size and patent
portfolio.
Another contribution of my research is to build on Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990)
construct of absorptive capacity. Their theory focuses on how a firm can identify new
information and incorporate that knowledge. A firm’s absorptive capacity not only allows this
identification and incorporation but allows the firm to benefit from this new knowledge. Firms
require knowledge in order to build new knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Past researchers
have linked absorptive capacity with abnormal returns in other settings such as mergers and
acquisitions (Jain, Kashiramka, & Jain, 2018). My proposed lens contributes to this line of
research, while building on Fitzgerald et al (2021), by considering how a focal firm’s absorptive
capacity explains potential abnormal returns in the cases of exploration and exploitation patent
applications.
While exploration and exploitation remain critical perspectives in the area of innovation,
many questions remain – especially about balancing these two approaches (Almahendra &
Ambos, 2015; Luger, Raisch, & Schimmer, 2018). My research will provide insights into the
potential advantages of a focus on either approach. By leveraging competing hypotheses, I
explore investor reaction to each form of innovation independently.
My proposed research also has significant value from a practitioner perspective. Firms
have limited resources at their disposal and therefore, must carefully determine how to allocate
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those resources. While both exploration and exploitation have been shown to benefit a firm's
financial success, investors may prefer one approach over the other. The potential for one
approach to be more appealing to investors is an important consideration on multiple levels.
Investor decisions play a critical role in driving stock prices. Further, maintaining a strong stock
price has numerous implications for a given firm. Strong stock performance can impact a firm’s
financing options including access to and cost of capital, as well as the value associated with
additional equity offerings. A firm’s senior leadership has many additional reasons to understand
how investors may react to strategic innovation-related decisions. These leaders are often
compensated, at least in part, based on criteria such as firm performance and stock price. They
would likely have other personal concerns about stock price as well. A lower stock price makes a
firm more vulnerable to a hostile takeover and has a negative impact on investor satisfaction.
Either of these occurrences may result in their removal. By providing insights to investor
reaction to the innovation strategies of exploration versus exploitation, my research can inform
senior business leaders of likely outcomes when they are faced with making this difficult
tradeoff.
This dissertation proposal is structured as follows. Following this introductory chapter
(chapter 1), I provide a literature review (chapter 2), which is followed by my hypotheses and
theoretical support (chapter 3). The document concludes outlining my proposed research
methods (chapter 4) and references.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
BACKGROUND
The opening remarks of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 2014-18
Strategic Plan stress the growing importance and use of protections on intellectual property to
grow the overall stock of innovation (United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2014). Indeed,
there has been increased use of the patent process by innovators. Half of all patents issued in the
fifty years after 1963 were issued since 2000 (United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2014).
In addition to public and private companies, universities and other organizations have been
encouraged to leverage the patent process to protect their innovations as well (Heller &
Eisenberg, 1998). An increasing number of patent applications is anticipated - even as the
USPTO works to decrease a backlog of over 600,000 unexamined patent applications (United
States Patent and Trademark Office, 2014; United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2021).
Firms can not only achieve protection of their innovations through patenting, patents also
have the advantage of providing insights about the knowledge that led to their creation in the
form of citations. As such, patent counts and citations have long been utilized by scholars as a
proxy for innovation (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2002). This data can provide insights to how a firm
uses different types of innovation such as exploration and exploitation in their internal
development processes. The approaches of exploration and exploitation result in different types
of innovative outcomes and require the use different capabilities (March 1991). Further, the lens
of absorptive capacity provides valuable insights on the learning capabilities of a given firm.
Developing these skills have numerous impacts as protections such as patents can also serve as a
means to attract customers and potential investors (Holgersson, 2013). Investor reactions to a
firm’s innovation approach can be measured utilizing an event study. Event studies allow one to

6

measure anticipated versus actual investor reaction to different events – including patent
application and granted dates (Austin, 1993).
The goal of this chapter is to provide a review of the scholarly work focused on
absorptive capacity, exploration and exploitation, patents, and event studies. I begin with a
summary of research on absorptive capacity, which is followed by an overview and definition of
exploration and exploitation. I then discuss how patent data and citations can be used to proxy
innovations and measure exploration and exploitation. Lastly, I review event study literature.

ABORPTIVE CAPACITY
Scholars have long argued that innovation is critical to a firm’s long-term success (e.g.
Schumpeter, 1942; March, 1991; Danneels, 2002). Innovation creates value for firms in the form
of a stronger market and financial position than their peers (Rubera & Kirca, 2012). Therefore, it
is important that firms focus on growing their ability to continuously innovate. In their seminal
1990 paper, Cohen and Levinthal introduced the construct of absorptive capacity – which they
define as “the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it,
and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen & Levinthal: 128). At the very heart of their theory lies
the idea that a firm must have prior knowledge in order to absorb new knowledge – which results
in increasing its overall stock of knowledge. Much as students depend on their previous
knowledge to serve as a foundation to add new knowledge, firms also build on past learning.
Without some kind of baseline knowledge or reference, a firm is unable to take in and apply new
concepts (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
A firm’s absorptive capacity not only speeds the innovation process but creates a loop of
sorts wherein the knowledge produced by the innovation is added to the organization’s
absorptive capacity (Kim & Kogut, 1996; Lane, Koka & Pathak, 2002). Thus, absorptive
7

capacity is the fuel to a firm’s innovative engine. It provides firms with the capability to grow its
knowledge, which in turn provides the opportunity for new sources of revenue and the ability to
absorb even more knowledge.
Absorptive capacity is widely used in various streams of research. In their 2006 review,
Lane, Koka, and Pathak note that Cohen and Levinthal’s 1990 paper had been used over 900
times in peer reviewed papers since its initial publication. It is not only a popular and well-tested
construct in innovation-related research but has applications in areas such as organizational
learning and strategic alliances as well (Lane, et al., 2002). Absorptive capacity has been used to
measure the effectiveness of international joint ventures and alliances demonstrating the
importance of a firm’s ability to exchange and absorb knowledge (Jain, et al., 2018; Lane &
Lubatkin, 1998; Lane, Salk & Lyles, 2001). Absorptive capacity has also been shown to provide
the ability to maximize the benefits that come from the complexity of a firm’s product portfolio
while minimizing the cost associated with this strategy (Fernhaber & Patel, 2012).
Despite its extensive history, absorptive capacity continues to be re-imaged and reconceptualized (Marabelli & Newell, 2014; Zahra and George, 2002). In their review, Zahra and
George (2002) expand on the construct suggesting that organizations have both the potential
capacity as they acquire knowledge and realized capacity as they leverage that knowledge. They
point to four dimensions: acquisition (prior investments, prior knowledge, intensity, speed, &
direction), assimilation (understanding), transformation (internalization & conversion) and
exploitation (use & implementation) (Zahra & George, 2002:189). Many scholars have built on
the potential vs. realized concept further extending absorptive capacity research (Jansen, 2005).
Jansen, Van De Bosch and Volberda (2005) are an example of this focus on potential versus
realized absorptive capacity. They found that factors including participation and connectedness
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of the team at the organizational level can influence a firm’s ability to benefit from their
absorptive capacity.
Absorptive capacity has been measured in a variety of ways beginning with Cohen and
Levinthal (1990), who utilized research and development intensity. In addition to the R&D, a
firm’s absorptive capacity has been measured with patent citations as well as number of patents
(DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999). Other proxies for absorptive capacity include: the number of
research communities (Deeds, 2001), R&D personnel investments and staffing (Zahra & George,
2002). In one study, the patenting activity of recently hired engineers was used to show that
learning by hiring is yet another effective approach to build a firm’s absorptive capacity (Song,
Almeida & Wu, 2003).
Not only does absorptive capacity positively impact a firm’s ability to innovate, but it
also has a positive effect on performance (Tsai, 2001). However, Wales, Parida, and Patel (2013)
found an inverted U-shaped relationship between absorptive capacity and firm performance
suggesting that a firm might have too much absorptive capacity. This may be due to the cost of
increasing absorptive capacity - a concern previously raised by Volberda, Foss and Lyles (2010).
The cost of acquiring new knowledge becomes increasingly expensive as firms must seek
sources more distinct from their current knowledge base (Wales, et al., 2013).
Similar to the previously discussed challenge of balancing exploration and exploitation,
absorptive capacity requires that an organization leverage existing internal knowledge while
continuing to seek and acquire additional external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Zahra
& George 2002). This creates a similar dilemma for firms as they seek to grow their absorptive
capacity.
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EXPLORATION VS. EXPLOITATION
Not only is innovation a key to a firm’s long-term success, but it is also important to
balance the improvement of existing capabilities (“exploitation”) as well as develop new ones
(“exploration”) (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). Exploration and exploitation have
been viewed by researchers as two very separate approaches firms can take towards innovation
(Benner & Tushman, 2002; He & Wong, 2004; March 1991). March (1991) theorized that the
two approaches require unique skills and are therefore mutually exclusive. As such, firms have
difficulty successfully focusing on both exploration and exploitation at the same time.
Despite their uniqueness, they are often linked in both research and practice. Focusing on
exploitation at the expense of exploration may result in short-term financial gain, but long-term
distress as the firm potentially lessens its ability to adapt to changes that take place over the longterm (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). As such, Tushman
and O’Reilly (1996) proposed that firms need to find the right balance between the two – a
concept known as “ambidexterity.” They point out that successful businesses grow and prosper
over extended periods of time. It is the combination of incremental improvement and developing
new innovations that allows a firm the ability to remain successful over time (Lavie, Stettner &
Tushman, 2010).
Due to their longevity, these firms not only have to deal with gradual change and
enhancements but must also address disruptive technological change as well as changing
environments (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Unfortunately, the focus on iterative improvement
may hinder a firm’s ability to explore the new opportunities that these changes present (Benner
& Tushman, 2002). Meanwhile, if a firm chooses to focus on exploration while failing to
leverage existing strengths, the results can be equally problematic for the firm’s future success
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(Levinthal & March, 1993). Hence the proposed balancing act of ambidexterity is critical. Firms
must find ways to remain competitive for both the long and near term (Benner & Tushman,
2003). There is still some debate as to what defines the right balance. Factors such as the firm’s
overall strategy and its external environment also affect the appropriate balance between
exploration and exploitation (Lavie, Stettner & Tushman, 2010; March, 1991). These factors will
be discussed in greater detail later in this section.
Indeed, firms that are able to strike a balance between exploration and exploitation have
been found to have greater sales growth. At the same time, a greater imbalance between the two
forms of innovation has been linked to a negative impact on sales (He & Wong, 2004). Despite
this strong support for maintaining balance, the challenge associated with doing so in practice
has received considerable scrutiny. For example, Christensen (1997) agrees that ambidexterity is
critical, but doubts it can be done within a firm. Thus, he suggests that a firm should create
separate affiliates to pursue exploration as a means of addressing the challenges of creating a mix
with exploitation in a single organization. He later suggests that this approach may be too
extreme, but continues to believe that finding the right mix is a challenge (Christensen &
Raynor, 2003).
O’Reilly & Tushman (2008) argue that leaders can configure their resources such that
their firms can both explore and exploit. Indeed, research suggests that there are some synergies
between these seemingly polar approaches giving further support to the idea that ambidexterity,
while challenging, is both achievable and beneficial (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Exploration
and exploitation may be more than two unique concepts. They work together to make the most of
the advantages of each other. Exploitation allows the firm to maximize the benefits from the
firm’s exploration activities by further improving on the advances and potentially finding other
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ways to leverage them. Meanwhile, exploration ensures that the firm’s overall knowledge will
continue to grow – creating new opportunities to exploit (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Cao,
Gedajlovic and Zhang (2009) find that both balance and combination of exploration and
exploitation work together to produce even greater benefits for firms. By looking at both the
relative magnitude and the combined aspect, they provide further support for the value of
ambidexterity as well as the argument that there is a synergy between exploration and
exploitation such that they are important not only in how they are balanced, but in their
combination as well.
There are many tools at a firm’s disposal for managing the relationship between
exploration and exploitation. For example, firms may focus on developing new innovations by
focusing on their internal sources, external sources or some combination of the two (Laursen &
Salter, 2006). These are important factors to consider. Research has shown that the more willing
a firm is to consider external sources of innovation, the greater their overall innovativeness
(Laursen & Salter, 2006).
Exploration – with its emphasis on growth and developing new markets – has been found
to have a greater impact on sales, profit and market share growth than exploitation (Auh &
Menguc, 2005). It also triggers more attention from investors (Fitzgerald et al., 2021). While
most scholars would agree that exploration is critical to the long-term health of the firm,
determining the right amount may be a challenging for business leaders. Indeed, too much or too
little exploration results in missed opportunity as demonstrated by the inverted U-shaped
relationship between exploration and financial performance, using Tobin’s Q (Uotila, Maula,
Keil, & Zahra, 2009; Belderbos, Faems, Leten, & Looy, 2010). Exploration and exploitation –
while both important – can have different effects on products. For example, product quality is
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improved when firms exploit their knowledge, but the firm’s innovativeness is enhanced when
pursuing a more explorative approach. Further, the authors found that the intensity of
competition acted as a moderator – where firms are more willing to take an exploration approach
when there are experiencing low levels of competitiveness (Molina-Castillo, Jimenez-Jimenez, &
Munuera-Aleman, 2011).

USE OF PATENT DATA
Patent data has been a common vehicle for scholars to measure innovation and value
creation (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2002; Somaya, 2012). Patents must be “novel and non-obvious”
and once granted it gives the holder “‘the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling’ the invention in the United States or ‘importing’ the invention into the United
States.” (United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2015:1) A patent gives a firm the right to
legally exclude others from utilizing their patented technology. This protection provides an
advantage over their competition. Indeed, the amount of patents in a given product class can
drive away potential new entrants (Cockburn & MacGarvie, 2011).
Patenting also improves innovation performance, which, in turn, positively affects
financial performance (Andries & Faems, 2013). Not only can firms achieve greater market
share, but higher margins as well. This holds true for not only large firms, but for small and
medium enterprises as well – even though these firms are less likely to patent innovations then
larger firms (Andries & Faems, 2013). This is an interesting phenomena as small firms can
especially benefit from an enhanced reputation as a result of patenting (Holgersson, 2013).
Despite the growth in patenting, R&D spending and technological progress have not
grown at a similar pace (Boldrin & Levine, 2013). This may be due in part to the fact that not all
innovations are patented (Holgersson, 2013). Additionally, factors such as firm size and the type
13

of innovation (product vs. process orientated) also play into the decision to patent (Somaya,
2012). As patents are public records, which, by definition, undermines secrecy, some innovations
go unpatented. Mosel (2012) found an inverted-U relationship between the impact of the
innovation and whether or not it would be patented. Small innovations are unlikely to be copied
and often not patented. At the other end of the scale, large impact innovations are often protected
with secrecy rather than patents. His research found that it is the middle-sized innovations that
are most likely to be patented. Another factor in deciding whether to patent an innovation is the
reality that it is an expensive proposition for firms to apply for patent protection. Not only are
there application fees, but firms often require expert legal advice (Andries & Faems, 2013).
Also, patents may not be as useful in protecting innovation in certain industries compared
to others (Cohen, Goto, Nagata, Nelson, & Walsh, 2002). As such, patenting growth varies
across industries (Cohen, 2004). National patent policy may also impact activity. For example,
the use of patents for strategic purposes such as negotiations varies across countries (Cohen,
Goto, Nagata, Nelson, & Walsh, 2002). Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) found that complementary
assets may play a role on patenting propensity. This builds on the idea that innovation is related
to the presence of key assets such as marketing and manufacturing capabilities (Teece, 1986).
Use of Patent Data in Research
Despite the various factors that may drive patenting propensity, firms continue to use
patents to protect their innovations. Indeed, some firms have entire departments dedicated to the
patent process (Mol & Wijnberg, 2011). As such, patent data has become a useful tool for
researchers. In his 2012 review, Somaya suggested there are three basic strategies for firms to
patent their ideas: propriety (where the firm seeks to create a competitive advantage by using the
innovation as a key resource), defensive (where firms attempt to avoid being challenged by
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competitors or other firms making claim on their technology) and leveraging (where the firm and
then uses the innovation to pursue other revenue opportunities). Patents can also be used to
measure the relative innovativeness between firms. Additionally, patents represent an excellent
tool for measuring scientific change. This is due not only to its availability, but because patent
data provides additional key insights including dates, industry, and inter-relativeness (Griliches,
1990).
Relatedly, researchers have found that firms may use patents in various ways as well.
They may see their patents as real options to either exploit or retain, signaling devices to
investors and potential partners or as tools to change laws or policies (Levitas & Chi, 2010;
Somaya, 2012).
A key aspect of this research is understanding the value of patents. Patents have been
found to not only result in greater returns for firms but to even have a negative effect on the
patenting firm’s rivals (Austin, 1993). When the patents are tied to a product, they are seen as
more valuable than an average patent. This phenomenon is further impacted when the patent is
announced in the popular press (Austin, 1993). When it comes to more complicated products, it
becomes likely the patents required to market the product are held by multiple firms (Cohen,
2004). This makes it more difficult for an individual firm to take key products to the
marketplace. When patents inhibit the creation new products by limiting a firm’s ability to
combine inventions, they can actually undermine and inhibit innovation (Hall & MacGarvie,
2010; Heller and Eisenberg 1998).
Patents have an impact of various aspects of the firm. Hall and MacGarvie (2010) found
that there is a positive performance impact for firms that patent important ideas, but there is a
negative impact when filing additional patents for inventions of lesser importance. Indeed,
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patents have even been used to analyze how firms structure themselves by looking at the
subsidiary to which patents are assigned (Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 2013). Patents can also
provide an indication of a firm’s internal knowledge - which in turn can impact make or buy
decisions (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006). Companies with strong patent histories have better
returns after an IPO as more patents result in better returns (Bessler & Bittelmeyer, 2008). Using
this same logic, patents have also been used as a proxy for creativity at the individual level.
Higher counts suggest a more creative individual. Further, the patent’s characteristics provide
insights as to whether the individual’s creativity will yield more incremental or divergent
outcomes (Audia & Goncalo, 2007).
Role of Patent Citation Information
Quantifying the inventive output of firms by using the patent activity and types of
citations has been widely used as a proxy to determine both the importance and influence of the
firm’s innovations (Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2001). This is due in part to their ability to
consider factors such as firm, industry, and timing (Roach & Cohen, 2013). Further, patent
citations represent a means to examine and understand how various inventions are related to one
another (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993).
A key component of the patenting process is identifying the previous patents on which
the latest innovation is based. These citations can be a valuable tool in measuring the value of a
patent. By considering the number of times a given patent has been cited by other patents, one
can determine how influential (and valuable) the original breakthrough was (Hall, et al., 2001).
Generally, the more a patent is cited, the more valuable the patent (Harhoff, Narin, Scherer
&Vopel, 1999). However, a firm’s ability to cite their own previous work (self- citations) can be
of greater value than external citations. The authors identify several reasons for this, including
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lower risk, lower costs to acquire new knowledge, and quicker entry (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg,
2005). A review of Japanese semiconductor firms demonstrated that firms tend to focus patent
activity in areas where they have previous patents (Stuart & Podolny, 1996). This is also
consistent with March and Simon’s (1958) landmark work which suggested firms are likely to
leverage their current areas of expertise as they seek out new opportunities.
Using Tobin’s Q for market value, Hall, et al. (2001) found that weighting patents based
on their citation gave a better indication of the firm’s value than unweighted consideration.
Further, the authors found that firms that were able to build on their previous breakthroughs
(measured by citing their own patents) doubled the impact of other patents. Looking at market
value provides some insights into how to interpret actions that may not have an impact until
several years in the future. Indeed, patents have been shown to have an immediate impact on
market value even though there is no immediate impact on productivity (Bloom & Van Reenen,
2002). Patent citations add value in their own right. Patel and Ward (2011) found that citation
can increase stock price using the citation date.
While many researchers point to the advantage of self-citations, it can be argued that the
more a given patent is cited in other patents applications, the greater the impact of that given
patent (Kim, Song, & Nerkar, 2012). As discussed previously, patent citations also provide
insights on a firm’s focus on exploration and exploitation. Firms that take a more explorative
focus tend to have more innovative output (i.e. patents) than other firms (Moreira, Torkomian, &
Soares, 2016).
The citations of a given patent provide a proxy for how valuable that patent is (Capaldo,
Lavie & Petruzzelli, 2014; Singh, 2008). The age of patents has decreasing value over time
(Capaldo, Lavie & Petruzzelli, 2014), however there is some evidence that having “old”
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knowledge that is external to a firm’s industry may help improve a firm’s innovation (Katila,
2002). If a firm seeks exploratory innovation, it must seek to move beyond the firm’s existing
competencies (Benner & Tushman, 2002).

EVENT STUDIES
An event study is a methodology used to determine the impact of a given event on a
firm’s value. It allows researchers to determine whether the event (such as a merger
announcement or leadership change) has an impact on the firm’s stock price (Dutta, 2014). The
seminal works by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) have created
the basis for this well-established approach. One review of this approach identified 565 articles
published in five major journals between 1974 and 2000 that utilized event studies to determine a
potential abnormal change in stock price (Kothari & Warner, 2007). Event studies are a very
commonly used methodology (Peterson, 1989). It has been argued that the event study
methodology is “the standard method of measuring security price reaction to some
announcement or event” (Binder, 1998:111). In his 1998 review, Binder concluded that the event
study methodology is a highly useful means to identify how a given event influences market
prices.
At the heart of the event study is the argument that if there is no “news” regarding a given
firm, its stock prices should rise (or fall) based on the information about the market as a whole.
Thus, the price would vary consistent with other similar firms. If a given firm’s price varies in an
abnormal fashion, one can deduce that there is unique information impacting the result (Ball &
Brown, 1968). This, in turn, informs researchers of the impact and rationale behind different
decisions – especially in the short term (Kothari & Warner, 2007). The event study uses a period
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of time around the event to estimate what results would have occurred if the event in question
had not transpired (Peterson, 1989; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).
In their original work, Fama, et al. (1969) demonstrated the impact of stock split
announcements on the firm’s stock price. Austin (1993) focuses on the dates of patents granted
in his event study exploring the impact of patents on rival firms. He points out that application
dates may not be well publicized impacting the validity of the event study (Austin, 1993: 254).
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
While numerous studies have shown that innovation creates value (e.g. Bloom & Van
Reenen, 2002), there are still several aspects of this relationship that remain unexplored. A firm’s
value – driven in part by stock price – has several important impacts on the firm’s long-term
success. It is a key tool for attracting investors, securing financing, and is often used to evaluate
management’s success and continued employment. As investors are a key driver of a firm’s
market value, it becomes critical to understand how they react to specific events and decisions
made by the firm’s leadership. These insights help firms develop strategies that will maximize
the value created when leveraging their limited resources.
If firms need to innovate to prosper, they must choose a path along the
exploration/exploitation spectrum. Selecting this path is a challenging endeavor. March (1991)
and others (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; Gupta, Smith and Shalley, 2006) argue a firm must
place a focus on both exploration and exploitation. However, this is easier said than done, as
exploration and exploitation require conflicting approaches and resources (He & Wong, 2004).
Just as the firm’s leadership must struggle with the balance, investors must evaluate these
decisions and react appropriately. Investors may recognize the need for innovation, but the
differences between exploration and exploitation would create challenges in this evaluation.
Eberhart, Maxwell and Siddique (2004) suggest that while investors react positively to
innovation announcements in general, they may, in fact, be underestimating the actual long-term
impact of such announcements. Indeed, firms that focus on exploitation are often undervalued
(Fitzgerald et al., 2021).
Not only do the risks and outcomes of exploration and exploitation vary but pivoting
from an exploration focus to exploitation activities is a critical, yet perilous challenge. As a
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result, I posit that investors will react differently to announcements associated with exploration
compared to announcements associated with exploitation. This reaction could be critical as a
firm must place enough focus on exploitation to maintain short term success, while also placing
enough emphasis on exploration to ensure future success (Levinthal & March,1993).
In this chapter, I develop a model of the impact of the type of innovation (exploration vs.
exploitation) and firm characteristics on abnormal returns. Using Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990)
absorptive capacity as a lens, I hypothesize about the influence a firm’s size and patent portfolio
have on abnormal returns after pursuing explorative and exploitive innovations. These outcomes
are important as they inform practitioners on the potential reaction to their strategic innovation
focus and could create a bias toward exploration or exploitation. Additionally, it considers
whether investors are considering the criticality of an ambidextrous approach toward innovation
and encouraging appropriate strategies. Lastly, this model helps address several seemingly
contradictory factors in this research stream.
The model I propose considers how different forms of innovation will impact investor
reaction in the form of abnormal stock returns. Further, I consider how firm characteristics
moderate this relationship.

Figure 1: A Model of the Impact of Innovation Type and Firm Characteristics on Abnormal
Returns
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A firm’s ability to balance exploration and exploitation (sometimes referred to as
ambidexterity) assists in a firm’s ability to gain and process knowledge and improves their
effectiveness (Fernhaber & Patel, 2012). Thus, this balance is desirable and associated with
positive firm performance (Geerts, Blindenbach-Driessen, & Gemmel, 2010; Rothaermel &
Deeds, 2004). However, the unique nature of explorative innovation versus exploitative
innovation requires varied inputs and result in varied outcomes. This draws one to my primary
research question: Do investors view exploration (exploitation) more positively than exploitation
(exploration)? Further, do firm specific characteristics moderate this relationship?
Interestingly, the literature proposes mixed results – with some scholars suggesting
outcomes that would likely drive a preference towards exploration and others toward
exploitation. This dilemma is important as it impacts firms on several levels, including potential
short- and long-term impacts. A firm’s absorptive capacity plays a key role in this dynamic.
While it can facilitate a shift in innovative approach, it still carries the risk of failure for the firm
(Swift, 2015). This suggests that while absorptive capacity is critical to both innovation and the
ability to pivot between exploitation over exploration, firms must carefully consider when to
focus and when to shift focus. Likewise, investors require a sense that the firm’s innovations will
bring the appropriate levels of value to justify an investment in the firm.
The interaction between exploration and exploitation is further complicated by the
finding that firms with strong exploitation competencies often have strong exploration abilities
(Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery, 2004).
Many scholars have argued that firms will often favor exploitation over exploration (Piao
& Zajac, 2016). Exploitation ties to absorptive capacity as it represents a firm’s ability to
leverage its existing knowledge in its ongoing operations and innovations (Van den Bosch,
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Volberda, & De Boer, 1999; Zahra & George, 2002.) A firm would want to build on past
successes and gain “quick hits” by using existing knowledge to spark improvements, efficiencies
and related innovations. While these factors would be important considerations, several other
factors may influence management’s decisions on which types of innovation to emphasize. Their
tactics must also appeal to investors. Firms will seek out approaches that help ensure a
significant return if they wish to tap into the capital markets critical to their funding (Levinthal,
1994). The nature of exploitation - with lower risks and shorter payback periods - may appeal to
investors. A focus on exploitation would be appealing to investors as they would be more likely
to see a quick return on their investment. This would cause investors to respond more favorably
to exploitation-related efforts. Even though a focus on exploitation can impact long-term results,
as the firm limits their knowledge growth, it may be more desirable than a focus on exploration
activity which carries greater risk and potentially longer payback periods (Uotila, Maula, Keilm
& Zahra, 2009).
There are additional arguments to support why firms and investors would prefer an
exploitation focus. Hall, et al., (2005) found that patents that relied on self-citations (a common
method of identifying a patent as exploitive) have greater value than patents relying on external
cites. This suggests by focusing on exploitative innovation, firms would create greater value –
which in turn would make this approach more appealing to investors.
However, there is also the risk that the easier nature of exploitation may result in too
much emphasis on exploitation (Volberda, Foss, & Lyles, 2010). This phenomenon is sometimes
referred to as a “competency trap” wherein a firm’s focus on exploitation begins to squeeze out
exploration (Levinthal & March, 1993; Sirén, Kohtamäki & Kuckertz, 2012). This approach
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undermines the need for a balanced, ambidextrous approach and can be damaging to the firm’s
chances for long term success.
Like exploitation, exploration plays a role in growing a firm’s absorptive capacity (Patel,
Kohtamäki, Parida, & Wincent, 2015). Additionally, the singular focus on exploitation can result
in failure to continue to the development of absorptive capacity (Levinthal, 1994). This exposes
the firm to the risk of being unprepared for new advances in their field (Levinthal, 1994).
Absorptive capacity is dependent on its “loop-like” nature. New knowledge is critical to fuel the
absorptive capacity loop, and exploration results in the insertion of critical external knowledge to
the firm. While this infusion of knowledge allows firms to grow their ability to innovate, an
exploration focus must be carefully managed. Due to an inverted U-shaped relationship, too
much (or too little) exploration undermines performance (Uotila et al., 2009). This creates a
dilemma for firms as they try to determine the appropriate mix.
While exploration is risky, ignoring this aspect of innovation is a potentially greater risk.
As such, there are numerous reasons for firms (and investors) to favor explorative innovation.
Since exploration requires new knowledge to be absorbed and applied, successful exploration
suggests that a firm has expanded its capabilities (Phelps, 2010; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). In
other words, the firm has successfully absorbed new external knowledge helping to ensure
ongoing success. Also, the short-term nature of exploitation is not as likely to result in higher
long term returns as a focus on exploration (Lewin, Long, & Carroll, 1999). This provides a key
financial incentive to both firms and investors.
Woolridge and Snow (1990) looked at the reaction to major strategic decisions –
including items like major capital investments and joint ventures. They found that, in general,
these types of decisions resulted in positive returns. This lends further credence to the idea that
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investors will reward a longer-term focus. Sood and Tellis (2009) also challenge the idea that
less risky, short-term projects are preferred as a means to increase stock prices. They track
returns over the life of innovation projects and find returns are thirteen times greater when
considering the life of the project as opposed to an individual innovation event. Thus, firms must
be careful to avoid assuming investors will focus exclusively on the short-term. The very nature
of explorative innovation – with new, larger leaps – may serve as an enticement to investors as
well (Fitzgerald et al., 2021).
Further complicating this dichotomy, exploration has the potential to improve or decrease
performance, while exploitation is more likely to maintain past performance trends (Lewin,
Long, & Carroll, 1999). This suggests that a firm’s efforts to innovate can result in a variety of
outcomes, and it is unclear which approach investors might favor. Investors might react
positively to both exploration and exploitation. Therefore, one could argue that firms and
investors would prefer innovations that are explorative or exploitative. Thus, I suggest two
competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1A: Exploitive innovation will generate higher positive abnormal returns
compared to explorative innovation.

Hypothesis 1B: Explorative innovation will generate higher positive abnormal returns
compared to exploitive innovation.

Firm Characteristics: Size
Certain firm characteristics have been identified as variables that might help predict how
a firm’s market value might grow over time (Kogan & Papanikolaou, 2012). Amongst these
variables, several previous studies have looked at firm size as a potential determinant in the
firm’s approach to innovation (e.g. Kleinknecht, 1989; Cohen & Klepper, 1996). A firm’s size
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can have significant impact on its approach to doing business. For example, in the case of a
smaller firm, there are several factors that could disadvantage it compared to larger firms including funding challenges, number of skilled employees and lack of information
(Kleinknecht, 1989).
However, when it comes to innovation, firm size impacts a variety of often-contradictory
factors. These aspects provide seemingly conflicting insights on whether a firm’s investors
would respond more favorably to exploration or exploitation activity based on the size of the
firm. Rothwell (1983) provides a breakdown of these advantages and disadvantages from the
perspective of a small firm as well as a large firm. For example, smaller firms tend to be more
challenged both in terms of raising capital as well as scaling their operations (Rothwell, 1983).
Further, smaller firms may be disadvantaged in acquiring funding for research activities due to
their dependence on banks versus internal funding as well as the impact of the potential risk
(Hottenrott, Hall, & Czarnitzki, 2016). The risk of infringing on a larger firm’s patent portfolio
(Blind, Edler, Frietsch, & Schmoch, 2006) and the application fees and expert legal advice
required when patenting further challenge smaller sized firms compared to larger firms (Andries
& Faems, 2013). Smaller firms also have less room for error and are at a greater disadvantage at
recovering from a strategic error than larger firms. Despite these potential challenges, patenting
activity still has a positive impact on smaller firms’ innovation and finances (Andries & Faems,
2013).
This is not to say that small firms are entirely lacking advantages. Smaller firms have the
ability to quickly respond to market changes in part due to a more streamlined management
structure. This structure also provides a more responsive approach to internal communication
and problem solving (Rothwell, 1983). While they have less ability to take a significant loss,
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smaller firms have more to gain and, in many ways, are better positioned for knowledge transfer
and absorption. They possess more streamlined and less bureaucratic processes which allow
them to communicate better and respond faster (Lee & Kim, 2016). Also, exploration allows for
more significant impact, and one of the key considerations for smaller firms is their ability to
grow (Wales, et al., 2013). Another argument in favor of small businesses is the finding that
innovation investments in small startups result in greater likelihood of a patent than innovationrelated investments in larger firms (Kortum & Lerner, 2001). Small firms have a higher rate of
major inventions when compared to large firms, and they tend to grow faster as well (Akcigit &
Kerr, 2018). These factors suggest that small firms are not only capable of developing innovative
products, but they can successfully patent and sell their inventions and grow their business.
Indeed, smaller firms that patent innovations tend to patent more frequently than larger firms
(Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999).
As Cohen and Levinthal (1990) pointed out, absorptive capacity is more than just taking
in external knowledge. It also includes the ability to transfer knowledge within an organization.
Smaller firms with their less bureaucracy may be in a better position to increase their absorptive
capacity and successfully launch explorative innovations. Further, they are more likely to benefit
from such innovations and the relative potential impact of a breakthrough is greater for a smaller
firm (Austin, 1993). These factors would make exploration an appealing option for smaller firms
and their investors. Indeed, smaller firms hold a higher portion of explorative patents compared
to large firms (Nooteboom, Van Haverbeke, Duysters, Gilsing, & Van den Oord, 2007).
Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga (2006) found that small firms that seek an
ambidextrous approach often out-perform their peers (at least in the eyes of their CEOs).
Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) looked at exploration and exploitation alliances and found that as
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the venture grew larger, size was a negative moderator. As smaller firms absorbed new
knowledge, they no longer needed a partner and could instead stand alone. Nevertheless, as
smaller firms engage in innovative activities, they are not only placing a strain on the financial
aspects of the firm but testing the leadership as well (Mc Namara & Baden-Fuller, 2007).
The absorptive capacity of a firm may also influence the decision of whether to focus on
exploration or exploitation. Much of the benefit from exploration comes from a firm’s ability to
absorb and leverage external knowledge. The absorptive capacity of a firm is in part based on the
knowledge it has accumulated over time (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). This focus on
increased flexibility and change (exploration) stands in contrast to focus on stability or allowing
for organizational inertia (exploitation) by building primarily on existing knowledge (Lavie,
Stettner, & Tushman, 2010). This places smaller firms at a disadvantage compared to larger
firms (Rothwell, 1983). Many smaller firms’ innovations represent a highly limited or
specialized area. This limits their abilities to absorb more complex external knowledge compared
to larger firms (Rocha, 1997). This is further exacerbated by the reality that external knowledge
is also critical to allow them to exploit their innovations after their initial breakthrough (Schmidt,
2010). Firms with greater absorptive capacity have a greater ability to leverage external
knowledge (Mowery, et al., 1996). Despite these challenges, evidence suggests that in some
ways smaller firms are better at innovation than large firms. For example, smaller firms receive
more patents per dollar spent on research (Klette & Kortum, 2004). Additionally, as firms grow
larger they often dedicate a proportionately lower amount of resources toward innovation –
which suggest that smaller firms may be better at major innovations (Cohen & Klepper, 1996;
Mansfield, 1981). Thus smaller firms have incentives to focus on exploration and exploitation –
and have demonstrated advantages and disadvantages to each area.
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While smaller firms have to find ways to overcome these challenges, larger firms are
better positioned to deal with the issues facing smaller firms. One key advantage of larger firms
is their size, which gives them the opportunity to organize themselves in a fashion that might not
be possible for a smaller firm. For example, larger firms have the ability to simultaneously focus
on exploration and exploitation by creating separate business units to focus on each area
(Lubatkin, et. al, 2006). Larger firms are also better positioned to deal with the financing and
scale challenges when compared to smaller firms. Their larger size allows them to more easily
attract skilled workers and external resources (Rothwell, 1993). Due to their greater sales, larger
firms are able to monetize innovations to result in a greater benefit compared to smaller firms
(Nooteboom & Vossen, 1995).
Larger firms are not immune from the risks associated with exploration. Larger firms are
faced with many disadvantages, including the fact that there may be less benefit for individual
contributors than in smaller firms (Nooteboom & Vossen, 1995). Rothaermel and Deeds (2004)
found that as firms grow larger, they are more likely to keep their more high-profile projects inhouse, which would limit the knowledge they absorb. They are also on the opposite end of the
spectrum when it comes to bureaucracy and communication (Rothwell, 1993). Larger firms may
actually struggle to absorb new capabilities compared to smaller firms (Mowery, et al., 1996). As
firms grow larger, the benefits of their innovations begin to decrease (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001).
Indeed, these large firm challenges have allowed smaller firms to be more effective at innovation
activities than larger firms (Nooteboom & Vossen, 1995).
These factors suggest that while exploration is important for a firm’s long-term success,
size matters. However, the impact is less than clear. Both small and large firms have advantages
that suggest they can successfully monetize breakthrough innovations that tend to come from
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exploration. Yet their strengths are varied when compared to the other. On the one hand,
exploration tends to be more inherently risky, and the return on the investment can take a longer
time – which suggest a benefit to larger firms. However, the nimbleness and relatively large
impact of a major breakthrough suggests a benefit to smaller firms. The size of the firm appears
to both positively and negatively impact the likelihood of success in explorative innovation.
Thus, I suggest two competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2A: The size of the firm will positively moderate the relationship
between exploration and abnormal returns such that larger firm size will result in
greater abnormal returns compared to smaller firm size.
Hypothesis 2B: The size of the firm will positively moderate the relationship
between exploration and abnormal returns such that smaller firm size will result
in greater abnormal returns compared to larger firm size.
Given the less risky – and still critically vital – role of exploitation combined with
typically shorter payback periods, one can surmise that exploitation activities will be met with a
more positive reaction for smaller firms – which will benefit from any positive impact to a
greater extent (Austin, 1993). However, the challenges that come with their scale result in larger
firms having more of an advantage in exploitation rather than exploration (Nooteboom et al.,
2007). As a firm’s size increases, so does the propensity for organizational inertia and focus on
exploitation (Lavie et al., 2010). Similar to exploration, there are multiple factors that suggest
firm size impacting exploitive innovation. This leads to the following competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3A: The size of the firm will positively moderate the relationship
between exploitation and abnormal returns such that smaller firm size will result
in greater abnormal returns compared to larger firm size.
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Hypothesis 3B: The size of the firm will positively moderate the relationship
between exploitation and abnormal returns such that larger firm size will result in
greater abnormal returns compared to smaller firm size.

Firm Characteristics: Patent Portfolio
Another commonly utilized firm characteristic is a firm’s patent portfolio (Ndofor,
Sirmon & He, 2011). Patents can be used as a proxy for a firm’s technical knowledge, because
the patents are themselves a product of a firm’s ability to innovate (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg,
2001). Further, they are a sign of a firm’s ability to absorb and grow knowledge (Ndofor &
Levitas, 2004). Indeed, firms with larger patent portfolios can be seen as firms that have
integrated more knowledge (Nooteboom et al., 2007).
Due to its cumulative nature, absorptive capacity allows the firm to leverage the
experiences from past innovations and apply them to new breakthroughs which leads to
improved performance results (Patel et al., 2015). The size and make up of a firm’s patent
portfolio provide insights to the relative impact of these past innovations. A more varied patent
portfolio is a sign of a firm with a greater variety of technological resources (Miller, 2004).
Lane, Koka and Pathak (2002) argue that a more diverse portfolio results in better performance
because of greater absorptive capacity required for such output. It also demonstrates an “ability
to develop new knowledge to deal with this incremental technological change” (Ndofor &
Levitas, 2004: 696).
Patent citations can also be used to understand the diversity of a firm’s innovative output
(Patel et al., 2015). Harrigan and DiGuardo (2014) looked at backward citations and argue it
presents a better proxy for absorptive capacity – while confirming a positive relationship with
future returns. Citations provide insights on whether the firm is absorbing external knowledge or
building on existing internal knowledge. The ratio of citations to patents has a direct impact of a
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firm’s market value “with an extra citation per patent boosting market value by 3%.” (Hall, et al.,
2005:1). Further, more diverse patent portfolios not only allow a firm to spread risk but expose
them to greater possibilities to combine technologies to create new inventions (Appio, De Luca,
Morgan, & Martini, 2019).
In this way, patent portfolios can aid firms in their quest to create innovative and
profitable products. A large portfolio allows firms to better determine the relative appeal of
different technologies they may be considering pursuing (Ernst, 1998). This is due in part to the
recognition that the success of a firm’s new products is dependent on the knowledge it has
gathered through past innovations (Klette & Kortum, 2004). This suggests that firms with larger
portfolios should have an advantage in determining which new innovations to patent. Indeed, the
value of individual patents is likely influenced by the other patents in the firm’s portfolio
(Andries & Faems, 2013).
By building a large patent portfolio, firms can leverage their internal knowledge and
experiences which increase the likelihood of a successful analysis of new innovations (Ernst,
1998). This results in increasing a firm’s absorptive capacity, which allows them to manage
diverse technologies while achieving higher profitability (Appio et al., 2019). This impact can be
seen in the bottom line as higher patent counts are associated with greater profit and higher
market values (Chen & Chang, 2010; Neuhäusler, Frietsch, Schubert & Blind, 2011). Relatedly,
citing from within a firm’s patent portfolio also increases that firm’s market value (Patel &
Ward, 2011).
So, it is not surprising that start-ups with strong patent portfolios were more likely to
experience both short- and long-term success (Bessler & Bittelmeyer, 2008). Growing one’s
patent portfolio has the additional benefit of reducing the incentives for competitors to innovate
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(Choi & Gerlach, 2017). These factors combine to suggest that firms with a larger patent
portfolio are best positioned to identify and monetize new innovations while keeping competition
at bay.
This further suggests that a firm’s patenting activity would be viewed favorably by
investors in both the case of explorative and exploitive patents – as both positively impact the
firm’s success. As firm with a larger portfolio would be better positioned to leverage their
internal knowledge and pursue patents that were most likely to result in success. In the case of
both exploration and exploitation, the portfolio size should moderate the relationship such that
investors will react more favorably when the firm’s current patent portfolio is large relative to
peer firms. Thus, it follows:
Hypothesis 4: The size of a firm’s patent portfolio will positively moderate the
relationship between innovation and abnormal returns such that a larger patent
portfolio will result in greater abnormal returns compared to a smaller patent
portfolio.
Hypothesis 5A: The size of a firm’s patent portfolio will positively moderate the
relationship between explorative innovation and abnormal returns such that a
larger patent portfolio will result in greater abnormal returns compared to a
smaller patent portfolio.
Hypothesis 5B: The size of a firm’s patent portfolio will positively moderate the
relationship between exploitative innovation and abnormal returns such that a
larger patent portfolio will result in greater abnormal returns compared to a
smaller patent portfolio.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS AND DATA
Sample
For the purposes of this study, I will focus on the biotech industry. This industry has an
established reputation for patenting new innovations (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000; Wu, Levitas &
Priem, 2005). Additionally, as there are numerous ways for a firm to protect its innovations,
focusing on a single industry helps ensure sample firms will leverage the patent process more
consistently (Basberg, 1987; Levitas, & McFadyen, 2009; Mansfield, 1986).
In order to create a sample that allows me to explore the relationship between explorative
and exploitive innovations and abnormal returns, I plan toleverage several publicly available
datasets. For much of the accounting and financial data, I will leverage Wharton Research Data
Services (WRDS), including their Compustat data files as well as the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) U.S. stock database. The United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) and the University of Virginia’s Global Corporate Patent Dataset (Bena, Ferreira,
Matos, & Pires, 2017) will provide patent and citation data.
I will also leverage the public dataset created by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and
Stoffman (2017) which matches patent data from 1926 to 2019 to the firm in the combined
Compustat and CRSP database. This will allow me to link specific patents to firm data outlined
in the following paragraphs. In order to be included, firms will have to have data in the CRSP
and Compustat datasets during the focal year.
Following the lead of past scholars, I intend to use an event study approach to determine
if patenting firms experienced abnormal returns in their stock price related to the patent
applications (e.g. Gaur, Malhotra & Zhu, 2013; Starks & Wei, 2013; Travlos, 1987; Uhlenbruck,
Hitt & Semadeni, 2006). I will then test my hypotheses using ordinary linear squares (OLS)
regression to determine if there were significant abnormal returns (Brown & Warner, 1985; Mc
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Namara & Baden-Fuller, 2007). Further, I will address potential issues such as multicollinearity
and skewness when the dataset has been created. The detailed methodology for the calculation of
each variable is described in the following paragraphs.
Dependent variables
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR): The dependent variable in this study is
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for the biotech firm in the days surrounding the firm’s
patent application date. I plan to use the market model methodology established by Brown and
Warner (1985) and used by others to measure investor reaction to the announcement of
explorative and exploitive patents. One can then calculate the expected stock price change based
on the market in general and compare it to the actual change in price for the focal firm.
The expected return for company “i” on day “t” can be shown as:
Eit = αi + βRmt + ξit
In this example, Rmt is market return on day t (Mc Namara & Baden-Fuller, 2007). Having
determined the expected return for a given firm on a given day, abnormal returns can be
calculated by subtracting the actual return on day t from the expected return. The cumulative
abnormal return is the determined by summing the abnormal returns over the event window
(Brown & Warner, 1985).
In order to determine expected returns, I will leverage the CRSP database which tracks
daily stock market returns. Following past research, my study utilize stock returns 130-30 days
prior to the application date of each patent application observed (Gaur et al., 2013).
CRSP will be utilized to determine the actual daily return for each observation. Using this
data, I will total the difference between the firm’s actual returns and expected returns for the five
days (-2, +2) adjacent to the patent application (Gaur et al., 2013). (For any application date not
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occurring on a Wednesday, I will need to avoid weekends.) The total of the daily difference
between the expected and actual results resulted in the CAR for each patent application.
Independent variables
Explorative and exploitive innovation: Quantifying the inventive output of firms by
using the patent activity and types of citations has been widely used as a proxy to determine both
the importance and influence of the firm’s innovations (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2002; Hall, Jaffe
& Trajtenberg, 2001). Patent law requires applicants to cite any prior art (e.g. patents, nonpatented research) (Cotropia, Lemley, & Sampat, 2013). As such, patent citations represent a
means to examine and understand how various innovations are related to one another (Jaffe,
Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993). This can be extended to provide insights as to the nature
(exploitive vs. explorative) of a given patent (Benner & Tushman, 2002). Building on this
research, I will leverage the Global Corporate Patent Dataset - which was assembled through a
grant at the Darden School of Business at the University of Virginia. This dataset captures
patents issued between 1980 and 2017 (Bena, Ferreira, Matos, & Pires, 2017). Due to a lack of
updates to this dataset after 2017, I will limit my sample to patents between 2010-2014. Using
these tools, I will develop a variable associated with explorative innovation and a second
variable exploitive innovation (Liu, 2014).
Following Benner and Tushman (2002), I will begin by exploring any self-citations (i.e.
when the firm cites one of its own patents) on the focal patent. Secondly, I will identify any
citations that are owned by another firm and have been cited by the focal firm on their past
patents. In both cases, these citations will suggest the firm is depending on their current stock of
knowledge in the creation of the new patent because they are relying on previously utilized
patents. These citations would be consistent with exploitation. If 80% or more of the citations on
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a given patent fall into one of these two categories, the patent will be categorized as exploitive
innovation (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Liu, 2014). An explorative patent would be identified
similarly. Any patent having 20% or fewer citations in the two categories above would be coded
as explorative. In addition to using 80% as the limit for exploitative innovation, I will test for
sensitivity by repeating this approach setting the limit at 40, 60, 90 and 100 percent.
Firm Size: As I study the impact of explorative and exploitive innovation on abnormal
returns, I consider firm size as a moderator. While there are numerous measures for firm size, I
plan to use the natural log of assets as a proxy for firm size based on the frequency of its use in
related literature (e.g. Asthana, & Zhang, 2006; Lee & Kim, 2014; Levitas & McFadyen, 2009).
Patent Portfolio: Firms’ patent portfolio will be created by using data assembled by in
the Global Corporate Patent Dataset (Bena, Ferreira, Matos, & Pires, 2017). This dataset was
specifically created to allow researchers to cross-reference firms issued patents by the USPTO
with firm specific identifiers found the Compustat dataset. Thus, it will allow me to capture a
firm’s patent counts while overcoming many of variations in firm naming conventions, including
subsidiaries and conglomerates (Bena, et al., 2017).
Control variables
Tobin’s Q: Tobin's Q is designed to measure a firm's market value compared to its book
value – which provides insights on how investors view the firm. This is a valuable measure on
several levels. First, it provides insights on intangible assets such as patents (Kumar, 2011;
Villalonga, 2004). It can also provide insight on a firm’s performance (Levitas & McFadyen,
2009). Firm performance has been linked to absorptive capacity (Wales, Parida & Patel, 2013).
Intangible assets and firm performance can influence investor reactions. As my study considers
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both patents and stock market returns, Tobin’s Q represents an important control. I will calculate
Tobin’s Q using Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) approximation which can be represented as:
[(Outstanding Common Stock*Share Price) + Value of Preferred Stock + (Short-term
liabilities – Short-term assets + Long Term Debt)] / [Firm’s Book Value of Total Assets]
All these values are captured at the firm level (Chung & Pruitt, 1994).
Firm Age: Firm age is another important control, as older firms are likely to have more
products in development (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Additionally, older firms are more likely
to focus on process related innovations, while younger firms tend to emphasize product-based
innovations (Kueng, Yang & Hong, 2014). Similarly, older firms are more likely to focus on
existing and older technology rather than newer innovations (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Firm
Age is calculated by the difference between the year of incorporation and the focal year.
R&D Expenses: R&D spending has several potential impacts to this study’s results,
including Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) seminal work that links R&D to absorptive capacity.
Several studies link R&D spending to market value (c.f. Asthana & Zhang, 2006; Griliches,
1981). Additionally, there is a linkage between R&D sending and number of patents awarded
(Griliches, Pakes & Hall, 1986). This variable will be calculated using the focal firm’s R&D
expense the year of the patent filing.
Leverage: A firm’s leverage can also impact investor reactions and should be controlled
for (Adami, Gough, Muradoglu, & Sivaprasad, 2010). I will measure leverage bydividing the
total debt by the total capital of the patenting firm in the focal year (Adami, et al., 2010; Levitas
& McFadyen, 2009).
Firm Drugs: New drugs can generate significant margins for the producing firm;
therefore, I will also control for recently approved drugs (Chen & Chang, 2010). I will utilize a
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unique a dataset with publicly traded biotech drugs from 2010-2019 to determine the count of
drug at the focal firm level.
Alliance Partners: As investors have been shown to react to a firm’s alliance
announcements, I will control for this by leveraging the SDC Platinum database to capture the
number of alliances with the patenting firm’s (Das, Sen, & Sengupta, 1998). In order to calculate
the number of alliances, I will capture the number of alliances formed in the focal year and the
four previous years (Yang, Lin, & Peng, 2011).
Leveraging the Darden School of Business at the University of Virginia’s Global
Corporate Patent Dataset, I limited my sample to publicly traded biotech firm patents filed
between 2010-2014 (Bena, Ferreira, Matos, & Pires, 2017). I then removed any patents by the
same firm that were filed on the same date. This was done to eliminate the potential ambiguity of
which patent was influencing results. The resulting dataset contained 3660 unique patents filed
by 164 different organizations. Additionally, I incorporated three new controls to those originally
proposed Methods Section.
First, I added a control to consider the potential influence of institutional ownership.
Institutional owners play a critical governance role which could impact investor reactions and
decisions (Dharwadkar, Goranova, Brandes, & Khan, 2008). This was measured by calculating
the percent of outstanding shares owned by institutional owners at the end of the focal year.
Secondly, I added a control for liquidity by measuring the bid-ask spread. This measure
provides valuable insight into market liquidity. Liquidity has been shown to have several
potential impacts on trading including the likelihood of a price change (Cashman, Harrison,
Seiler, & Sheng, 2019). For the purposes of this study, I utilized CRSP to calculate the relative
daily bid-ask spread using the following formula:
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𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡(𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖 - 𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖).
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 (𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖+𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖 )/2
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 ( 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖/𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖).
The third new control was created by establishing dummy variables at the firm level to
account for firm-specific effects. Patents per firm in the sample ranged from 1 to 267, including
10 out of 164 firms with over 100 patents in the sample.
Lastly, I modified the calculations of two of the original controls. R&D expenses were
calculated as R&D Intensity dividing expenses by number of employees by R&D expenses
rather than simply using expenses as proposed. This change was due to the strong correlation of
R&D expenses with other variables including Firm Size and Patent Portfolio. Additionally,
Tobin’s Q was calculated as (number of outstanding shares of stock*Year-end stock price)/Total
assets rather than [(Outstanding Common Stock*Share Price) + Value of Preferred Stock +
(Short-term liabilities – Short-term assets + Long Term Debt)] / [Firm’s Book Value of Total
Assets]. The correlation between these two calculations should have a negligible impact on the
findings.
Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dataset, and Table 2a and 2b share the
correlations. These tables also highlight multiple dependent (CARS) and independent
(Exploitation Percentage) measured at different thresholds. These thresholds were utilized in
separate the regression analyses to test each combination’s impact on results. Cumulative
Abnormal Returns (CARS) were calculated using five unique result windows (-1,+1), (-2,+2), (-
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5,+5), (0,+3) and (0,+5) as opposed to only the (-2,+2) window originally proposed.
Additionally, rather than using the proposed Market Model Method (described earlier), CARS
was calculated using the Daily - with Fama French (Two Step) function capability in Eventus.
These results are shared in the accompanying tables. The sample was then retested using the
Market Model Method via Eventus - which produced quantitively similar results.
Additionally, exploitation was calculated at the four levels (40%, 60%, 80% and 90%)
based on the percentage of self and repeat citations to total citations. For the sake of brevity, I
will summarize the results of most combinations while including a few selected detailed results.
Due to the high correlation between size, alliances and patent portfolio, I conducted a
variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis for the models examining the effect of Firm Size. The
VIF reported that Firm Size, Firm Age and Alliances as well as several dummy variables had
inflation factors greater than 10. Removing the controls with highly correlated variables reduced
the VIF of Firm Size to below 10 thus addressing multicollinearity without changing my
findings.
For the models considering the effect of patent portfolio on CARS, the control for Firm
Age and Alliances had an inflation factor greater than 10. Removing these controls eliminated
any inflation factors over 6 and had no impact on the F Value of 2.45 with p <.0001.
Table 3 reports the results of the OLS Regressions of Exploitation and Size on
Cumulative Abnormal Returns. In particular, I report on three combinations. Model 1 considers
a (-1,+1) interval for CARS with a 40% threshold for exploitation. Model 2 explores a (-2,+2)
interval for CARS with a 80% threshold for exploitation and Model 3 looks at a (-5,+5) interval
for CARS at the same 80% threshold for exploitation. All three models provided significant F
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Values with p <.0001. The additional 17 models considering CARS and Exploitation the other
levels outlined in the Methods Section were also significant. Similarly, the models without the
interaction between Size and Exploitation also resulted in significant F values.
I calculated the change in F Value between each of the models with and without the
interaction between Size and Exploitation. The F Change was calculated using the following
formula (Duke.edu, 2013):
F = ((SS1−SS2)/(df1−df2))/(SS2/df2)
The resulting p-values (0.2944, 0.7339, 0.7668 respectively) were not significant, suggesting the
model with interaction is not significantly better than the model without the interaction. Further,
comparing the 40 models with and without the interaction resulted in minimal and at times
negative R-square change. These results are reported in the accompanying tables.
The hypothesized effects were mostly not supported. The direct effect of
exploration/exploitation on CARS had some significant effect on only 8 of the 80 models tested.
While Model 1 did suggest a positive effect for the interaction between Size and Exploitation at
p <0.1 and a negative effect for exploitation at p < 0.05, the vast majority of the other models
(including Model 2 & 3) showed no effect. Thus, hypotheses 2A, 2B, 3A and 3B were not
supported. One interesting trend is that as the CARS interval and percent exploitation increased,
the significance decreased. This could suggest a connection between investors having a more
immediate reaction to more exploratory innovation.
Similarly, Table 4 reports the results of the OLS Regressions of Exploitation and Patent
Portfolio on Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Once again, I report on the three same
combinations. Model 1 considers a (-1,+1) interval for CARS with an 40% threshold for
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exploitation. Model 2 explores a (-2,+2) interval for CARS with an 80% threshold for
exploitation and Model 3 looks at a (-5,+5) interval for CARS at the same 80% threshold for
exploitation. Once again, all three models provided significant F Value with p <0.0001. The
additional 17 models considering sensitivity for CARS and Exploitation were also significant.
However, the hypothesized effects were not supported by any of the models. Thus, hypotheses 4,
5A and 5B were not supported.
Additionally, I calculated the change in F Value between a version of each of the models
with and without the interaction between Exploitation and Patent Portfolio. Once again, the
resulting p-values (0.7227, 0.6549, 0.8409 respectively) were not significant, suggesting the
model with interaction is not significantly better than the model without the interaction.
Despite the lack of support in the model, Firm Size and Patent Portfolio show a strong
correlation with all five measures of CARS.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Variable
CARS (-2,+2)
CARS (-1,+1)
CARS (-5,+5)
CARS (0,+3)
CARS (0,+5)
Exploitation at 40%
Exploitation at 60%
Exploitation at 80%
Exploitation at 90%
Firm Size
Patent Portfolio
Tobin's Q
Firm Age
R&D Intensity
New Drugs
Leverage
Alliances
Liquidity
Institutional Ownership

N
3660
3660
3660
3660
3660
3660
3660
3660
3660
3660
3660
3660
3660
3657
3660
3660
3660
3659
3660

Mean
0.02
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.02
0.74
0.69
0.63
0.58
6.51
140.044
3.95
20.52
372.91
0.06
0.34
3.37
0.00
0.55
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s.d.
0.07
0.06
0.10
0.06
0.08
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.49
2.28
194.366
3.64
8.11
237.42
0.27
2.15
5.73
0.01
0.35

Min
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
-29.28
0.00
-0.01
0.00

Max
0.72
0.71
0.8
0.73
0.76
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
11.14
1090
76.38
107.00
2715.00
2.00
25.38
20.00
0.12
1.77

Table 2 Correlations (Part 1)
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Variable
1
1 CARS (-2,+2)
2 CARS (-1,+1)
0.63***
3 CARS (-5,+5)
0.50***
4 CARS (0,+3)
0.54***
5 CARS (0,+5)
0.41***
6 Exploitation at 40%
-0.01
7 Exploitation at 60%
-0.01
8 Exploitation at 80%
0.00
9 Exploitation at 90%
0.00
10 Firm Size
-0.15***
11 Patent Portfolio
-0.08***
12 Tobin's Q
0.03
13 Firm Age
-0.07***
14 R&D Intensity
0.07***
15 New Drugs
0.02
16 Leverage
0.02
17 Alliances
-0.12***
18 Liquidity
0.1161
19 Institutional Ownership -0.11***
+
p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.001, ***p<0.0001

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0.35***
0.50***
0.35***
-0.03*
-0.03
0.00
-0.01
-0.11***
-0.07***
0.01
-0.06**
0.04**
-0.01
0.00
-0.08***
0.12076
-0.09***

0.41***
0.56***
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
-0.28***
-0.13***
0.04*
-0.14***
0.15***
0.02
0.03
-0.18***
0.15177
-0.20***

0.66***
-0.01
-0.02
0.01
0.01
-0.15***
-0.11***
0.00
-0.06**
0.03*
0.00
0.01
-0.09***
0.11121
-0.12***

-0.012
-0.02
0.00
-0.01
-0.21***
-0.12***
0.03
-0.08***
0.10***
0.02
0.01
-0.13***
0.11751
-0.16***

0.87***
0.77***
0.70***
0.01
0.08***
0.09***
0.09***
0.12***
-0.10***
0.00
0.01
-0.03
0.02

0.889***
0.80***
0.00
0.07***
0.12***
0.09***
0.13***
-0.10***
0.00
0.00
-0.02
0.01

0.90***
0.01
0.06**
0.13***
0.08***
0.14***
-0.08***
-0.01
0.01
-0.02
0.03

0.01
0.06**
0.13***
0.07***
0.12***
-0.07***
-0.01
0.00
-0.02
0.02

Table 2 Correlations (Part 2)
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Variable
10
1 CARS (-2,+2)
2 CARS (-1,+1)
3 CARS (-5,+5)
4 CARS (0,+3)
5 CARS (0,+5)
6 Exploitation at 40%
7 Exploitation at 60%
8 Exploitation at 80%
9 Exploitation at 90%
10 Firm Size
11 Patent Portfolio
0.61***
12 Tobin's Q
-0.15***
13 Firm Age
0.38***
14 R&D Intensity
-0.31***
15 New Drugs
-0.16***
16 Leverage
0.04**
17 Alliances
0.66***
18 Liquidity
-0.45***
19 Institutional Ownership 0.50***
+
p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.001, ***p<0.0001

11

12

13

-0.14***
0.45***
-0.18***
-0.10***
0.04**
0.59***
-0.19***
0.28***

0.10***
0.19***
-0.04**
0.02
-0.19***
-0.06***
-0.01

-0.18***
-0.01
0.03**
0.35***
-0.11***
0.14***

14

15

0.12***
-0.01
-0.14***
0.12***
-0.10***

-0.02
0.01
0.04**
-0.02

16

17

0.02
-0.05** -0.18***
0.03
0.21***

18

-0.30***

Table 3 OLS Regressions of Exploitation and Size on Cumulative Abnormal Returns
VARIABLES

MODEL 1

MODEL 2

DV: CARS (-1,+1)

DV: CARS (-2,+2)

Exploitation at 40%

MODEL 3
DV: CARS (-5,+5)

-0.016*
(0.007)

Exploitation at 40% x Firm Size

0.002+
(-0.001)

Exploitation at 80%

-0.005

-0.006

(0.008)

(0.011)

0.001

0.001

(0.001)

(0.002)

0.001

-0.006

-0.004

(0.001)

(0.004)

(0.005)

-0.000

-0.001

-0.001+

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.001)

0.002+

0.001

0.003+

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

Exploitation at 80% x Firm Size
Firm Size

Tobin's Q

Firm Age
R&D Intensity

New Drugs

Leverage

Alliances
Liquidity
Institutional Ownership
Intercept
Observations
F Value
F Change

0.001

0.001

0.001*

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.012+

-0.003

-0.097

(0.007)

(0.012)

(0.012)

0.001

0.001+

0.002*

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001

-0.001

+

-0.001

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

0.967***

0.744*

0.453

(0.227)
0.001

(0.290)
0.000*

(0.397)
-0.017*

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.008)

-0.041*

-0.016*

-0.110*

(0.032)

(0.040)

(0.055)

3656
2.45***
1.106

3656
2.66***
0.116

3656
4.51***
0.073

+

p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.001, ***p<0.0001
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Table 4 OLS Regressions of Exploitation and Patent Portfolio
on Cumulative Abnormal Returns
VARIABLES

Exploitation at 40%

MODEL 4

MODEL 5

MODEL 6

DV: CARS (-1,+1)

DV: CARS (-2,+2)

DV: CARS (-5,+5)

-0.003

-0.001

(0.003)

(0.005)

0.001

0.000

-0.006+
(0.003)

Exploitation at 40% x Patent Portfolio

0.001
(0.000)

Exploitation at 80%
Exploitation at 80% x Patent Portfolio
Patent Portfolio

Tobin's Q

Firm Age
R&D Intensity

New Drugs
Leverage

Alliances
Liquidity
Institutional Ownership
Intercept
Observations
F Value
F Change
+
p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.001, ***p<0.0001

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.001

-0.001

-0.001

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.001

-0.001+

-0.001

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.001)

0.002*

0.002+

0.003

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.002)

0.001

0.001

0.001*

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.012+

-0.003

-0.010

(0.007)

(0.010)

(0.012)

0.000

0.001

0.002*

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001

-0.001

+

-0.001

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

0.946***

0.665*

0.486

(0.224)
0.001

(0.286)
0.001

(0.392)
-0.017*

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.008)

-0.047

-0.006

-0.116*

(0.031)

(0.040)

(0.054)

3656
2.44***
0.117

3656
2.65***
0.200

3656
4.51***
0.404
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Discussion
This study sought to build on past research regarding investor reactions to a firm’s
decision to pursue explorative versus exploitive innovation. As exploitation has a relatively low
risk and reward compared to exploitation, there is reason to believe investors may respond
differently to these approaches. Further, the study considered whether firm specific
characteristics such as firm size and patent portfolio moderated these reactions.
My results at the (-1, +1) interval for CARS with a 40% threshold for exploitation did
find a significant (p<0.05) results for the direct effect of exploitation – which was negative.
Additionally, the interaction between size and exploitation was found to be positive at p<0.1.
While these results on their own suggest investors may react negatively to exploitative patents
with firm size positively moderating that interaction, the lack of significant findings in the 19
other variations of this model demonstrate this conclusion cannot be supported. Similarly, the
results of my 20 models examining interaction between patent portfolio and exploitation did not
support my hypotheses for this interaction.
My findings did not mirror much of the past research cited which may be due – in part –
to several differences in my methodology compared to Fitzgerald et al. (2021). While I chose to
measure investor reaction at the patent level, Fitzgerald et al. (2021) considered this at the firm
level. Their research included a measure they call “Internal Search Proximity which examines the
degree of overlap between patents granted to the firm in year 𝑡 and the existing patent portfolio
held by the same firm up to year 𝑡−1” (Fitzgerald et al., 2021: 8). Similarly, they looked at a
firm’s overall patents granted in a given year to determine a focus on exploration versus
exploitation – rather than my approach to look at individual patents issued on a given date. It is
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also worth noting that they used the patent’s issue (granted) date; whereas, I used the filing date
as a basis for my event study.
There were other important differences in our research as well. For example, my research
focused on biotech industry patents filed between 2010-2014. Fitzgerald et al. (2021) utilized a
much broader sample of the NBER patent database spanning several additional industries over a
much longer period of time (1976-2006). They also considered advertising expenses. They
argued firms spending more on advertising would raise investor awareness of that firm’s
patenting activity (Lou, 2014). While both studies factored the potential impact of institutional
investors, Fitzgerald et al. (2021) sub-categorized institutional investors based on their likely
focus on long-term versus short-term returns (Bushee, 1998). These methodology differences
likely contributed to the differences in my findings compared to Fitzgerald et al. (2021).
Limitations
As with any research, this study has several limitations. As mentioned above, I utilized a
sample of 164 biotech firms for my study. Therefore, it is not generalizable to other industries.
Additionally, utilizing the filing date to measure investor reactions makes the assumption that
investors are actively monitoring and reacting to a firm’s USPTO filings. Future research may
want to consider the date of patent-related announcements. Further, as filed patent applications
may not result an issued patent, investors may choose to focus on the issue date instead. Another
consideration is the impact of other announcements related to the focal firm that occurred in the
same window. While I did remove 1379 patents that had the same firm and same filing date, I
did not control for other potential announcements. Important firm updates on issues ranging from
earning announcements to senior leadership changes could also influence investor reaction to a
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given stock. A final limitation is defining exploration/exploitation based on the firm that was
awarded a given patent. This approach may overlook innovation that was the result of leveraging
knowledge built through alliances as well as the impact of patents that were acquired by the focal
firm.
Future Research
While this study found no support for the hypotheses that firm size and patent portfolio
moderate investor reaction to different types of innovation, it does suggest some additional paths
for future research. As stated previously, one interesting trend is that as the CARS interval and
percent exploitation increased, the significance decreased. This could suggest a connection
between investors having a different reaction to more exploratory innovation. Future research
could explore this apparent trend by determining whether there is a more immediate reaction to
certain type of innovation compared to others.
Additionally, several of the control variables including firm age, new drugs, institutional
ownership, and especially liquidity had a significant contribution to the model. Past research
demonstrates the role institutional ownership can play in corporate governance (Bushee, 1998;
Bena, et al., 2017). In light of their relatively large holdings, institutional owners would
potentially be highly influential in any change in stock price and may have specific preferences
towards the risk versus reward tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. The classification
developed by Bushee (1998) might demonstrate a link between institutional owners with shortterm versus long-term interests and the similarly situated more short-term nature of exploitation
versus the more long-term nature of exploration. A deeper understanding of the role factors such
as liquidity, age and recent history of innovation may warrant further study as well. For example,
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firms on the higher end of these factors’ spectrums may be more likely to achieve success
pursuing exploration – as they have demonstrated a history of success – than firms at the lower
end. This might suggest their experience results in reducing the relative risk associated with the
pursuit of explorative innovation.
Lastly, the Correlation Matrix suggests a few potentially counterintuitive relationships
including the lack of significant correlation between New Drugs and Alliances as well as New
Drugs and Institutional Ownership. One might consider whether alliances help drive new
innovations (e.g. drugs) in only certain settings. Similarly, does the introduction of new drugs
attract institutional investors?
This represents several opportunities to further pursue the relationships explored in this
study.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while this study did not find significant results, it provided a unique
approach to build on past research on investor reactions to different forms of innovation –
exploration and exploitation. Gaining a better understanding of this relationship can inform both
investors and business leaders of the potential financial impacts to two different approaches to
innovation. Hopefully, it will inspire future researchers to explore this relationship and provide
new insights.
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